Out recently from Routledge, Sellars and Davidson in Dialogue: Truth, Meanings, and Minds:

Including my “Who Needs You? Sellars and Davidson on the Social Character of Thought and Meaning”:

The orthodox view among Western philosophers, psychologists, and other scientists has long been that any shared, public qualities of intentional states are not fundamental or explanatory. While we do interact and share thoughts with others, the content of those states and the possibility of having them does not require the existence of other persons or interaction with them. It’s nice to have someone to talk to, but not a necessary condition for intentional states like ours. Donald Davidson and Wilfrid Sellars bucked this trend, insisting upon the necessity of other persons for various features of intentional states. They share this divergence despite considerable differences between their projects. This chapter will make the case that they are right to take this approach, though Sellars’ work provides us with a clearer path to it. While Davidson’s triangulation account rightly suggests that concern for objectivity in one’s beliefs necessitates attention to other perspectives, Sellars’ emphasis on shared commitments show why this should involve other persons rather than simply further information.