Link: https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/103/1-2/article-p12_2.xml

Some will see this as an intriguing new article that gets to the root of some ambiguities in the Private Language Argument and resolves them with a novelty and simplicity that Wittgenstein would have liked. Others will see it as a duck.¹

“In this article, we consider several responses to Wittgenstein’s private language argument (PLA) beginning with A.J. Ayer’s “Robinson Crusoe” thought experiment from his 1954 symposium with Rush Rhees. While I’ll claim that Ayer’s response is unsound and doesn’t imperil a properly understood version of the PLA, it does point towards more enduring concerns. Even if private language is impossible, the PLA may not preclude the possibility of “solitary” speakers –isolated individuals who are the sole speakers of languages they develop, even though others could later learn these languages. I present an analysis of these problems as a trilemma for defenders of the PLA and offer a response that suggests some ways to defuse it.”

Wolf, M. P. (2026). A Trilemma for Defenders of the Private Language Argument: (And Some Thoughts on How to Solve It). Grazer Philosophische Studien, 103(1-2), 12-32. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000265

1. This is a Wittgenstein joke, just trust me. ↩︎

Link: https://rdcu.be/frrB6 (This gives you access to a free read-only version. Not sure how long it lasts.)

This is the result of 34 years of thinking about this subject (or ancillary and ancestral versions of it), ever since I was a work study in the basement of the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. I think your best experience of it will come from reading it in the voice of Ewen McGregor as Obi-Wan Kenobi at the end of Revenge of the Sith, shouting, “YOU WERE THE CHOSEN ONE!!!”

With recent advances in generative AI models and their adoption by many commercial users, there has been wider discussion of the possibility that artificial general intelligence (AGI) will emerge from these systems in the near future. This discussion is muddled somewhat by conflicting conceptions of AGI and what successful trials imply. I argue for the necessity of certain social features in any system that can be ascribed general intelligence. Much of the discussion thus turns to theory of mind and attempts to model this with generative AI. These features are particularly important for a type of epistemic responsibility that has proven especially thorny for generative AI models, and I argue that the current generation of systems will not scale towards success on these fronts. While this is not an a priori dismissal of the very possibility of artificial intelligence, it implies a need to radically rethink future approaches.

“LLMs, Epistemic Responsibility, and the Prospects for AGI.” Minds and Machines, 36, article 35, published online 01 July 2026. DOI:10.1007/s11023-026-09790-z